Budgetary Control of Off-Budget Operations in Algeria

Abstract

This study examines the legal and accounting framework governing off-budget operations in Algeria, in light of recent financial reforms and the requirements of Organic Law 18-15 and Public Accounting Law 23-07.

The article analyzes how public institutions execute these operations—performed in addition to their core missions—and investigates the associated budgetary control mechanisms. The findings indicate that while off-budget operations benefit from certain flexibilities, such as exemptions from prior budgetary visas for specific outlays, they remain strictly bound by competition rules and public procurement regulations, as well as rigorous ex-post audits. Furthermore, the study highlights a legislative shift in revenue distribution; the legislator has moved from emphasizing individual incentives toward strengthening institutional self-financing (60% share). This shift underscores a profound and integrated financial and accounting relationship between budgetary and off-budget frameworks.