Collective Dominance Under Indian Competition Law: A Comparative Legal and Policy Analysis with the United States, Canada and the European Union

Abstract

Collective dominance, also called joint dominance, occurs when two or more independent companies, without necessarily forming a cartel, have enough combined market power to control market conditions, limit competition, or impose unfair terms on consumers, suppliers, or rivals (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],2012,pp 15-18). This concept is well-recognised under European Union competition law, especially through Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Treaty on the Functioning of European Union [TEFU],2012, Art.102). However, Indian competition law has not explicitly included collective dominance as part of abuse of dominance under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act,2002, S.4).

Section 4 of the Competition Act bans the abuse of a dominant position by an “enterprise or group”(Competition act, 2002, S.4) Nonetheless, the legal definition of “group” mainly relates to ownership, control, management, or shareholding ties, rather than to independent companies operating in an oligopolistic market. Consequently, Indian competition law currently recognises dominance only when exercised by a single enterprise or a legally recognised group, not when multiple independent firms collectively hold market power. Indian case law has consistently emphasised this restriction, including in rulings involving cab aggregators, e-commerce platforms, and the refined copper industry (Fast Track Call Pvt. Ltd.,2017, para.19-23; Samir Agarwal v. Competition Commission of India, 2021, para. 12-16). In 2025, the Competition Commission of India reaffirmed in the Hindalco–Vedanta copper supply case that collective dominance is not acknowledged under the current law (Airen Metals Private Limited v. Hindalco Industries Ltd.,2025, para.28-34) , and parallel conduct by two independent companies cannot be scrutinised under Section 4 unless one is individually dominant. (CCI dismisses abuse of dominance claims against Hindalco, Vedanta in copper supply market, 2025)  

This paper studies the foundations of collective dominance in Indian competition law from conceptual, legal, and economic perspectives. It compares India’s approach to those of the United States, Canada, and the European Union. The U.S. generally dismisses liability based solely on oligopolistic interdependence or conscious parallelism unless there is clear evidence of agreement, conspiracy, monopolisation, or attempted monopolisation. Canada, however, uses a more adaptable statutory framework under Section 79 of the Competition Act, which considers whether “one or more persons” significantly or entirely control a market(Canada Competition Law, S.79). The European Union has developed a more sophisticated doctrine of collective dominance, recognising that two or more entities can jointly maintain a dominant position if structural links, economic interconnectedness, transparency, and retaliation mechanisms facilitate coordinated market behaviour.

The paper contends that India’s current legal framework leaves a gap in enforcement within oligopolistic markets, where firms are able to collectively change market conditions without explicitly colluding under Section 3 or being individually dominant under Section 4. It concludes with a suggestion for a nuanced statutory amendment, sector-specific enforcement guidelines, evidentiary safeguards, and an effects-based approach to addressing collective dominance in India.